On August 29, 2026, The New York Times published an article by Anupreeta Das titled “Modi Is Hedging Against Trump, One Deal at a Time.”
Its central argument is striking.
The article portrays Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s unusually intensive diplomatic engagement over the past year as part of a broader Indian strategy to protect the country against an increasingly unpredictable international environment—and particularly against uncertainty in India’s relationship with the United States under President Donald Trump.
The argument is not that India is abandoning America.
It is more subtle.
India appears to be trying to ensure that America remains important without becoming indispensable.
That distinction may explain much of India’s contemporary foreign policy.
According to the Times, Modi has made official visits to at least 20 countries since August 2025, seeking new partnerships or strengthening existing ones. These engagements have increasingly produced concrete outcomes involving trade, technology, defence, energy, investment, critical minerals, artificial intelligence, education and maritime security.
The underlying strategy can be summarized simply:
Do not replace one dependency with another. Build enough relationships that no single country can dictate India’s choices.
This is essentially India’s traditional doctrine of strategic autonomy, adapted for an era of tariffs, technology competition, supply-chain disruption, wars and increasingly transactional great-power politics.
And that is why the article is significant.
It is describing something potentially larger than Modi’s diplomatic travel schedule.
It is describing the emergence of an increasingly multi-aligned India.
What Does “Hedging Against Trump” Actually Mean?
The word hedging is important.
In finance, hedging means protecting yourself against the possibility that one investment or position moves against you.
Countries can do something similar.
Imagine India has important relationships with:
United States
Russia
European Union
France
Japan
Australia
United Kingdom
Middle East
Southeast Asia
Africa
If relations with one partner deteriorate, relationships with others provide alternatives.
That is geopolitical hedging.
It does not necessarily mean hostility toward Washington.
It means reducing vulnerability to Washington.
The difference is crucial.
India still has powerful reasons to maintain a strong relationship with the United States—including technology, investment, defence cooperation, education, the Indian diaspora and Indo-Pacific security.
But New Delhi also has powerful reasons not to make its economic or strategic future dependent upon American political predictability.
The Times article essentially argues that Modi’s answer has been diversification.
Why Did India’s Strategy Accelerate?
India has pursued strategic autonomy for decades, so diversification itself is not new.
What has changed is the urgency.
According to the Times analysis, several developments accelerated India’s recalibration.
One was the Trump administration’s tariff policy.
The article reports that after President Trump announced broad tariffs in February 2026, Washington increasingly criticized India’s relatively protectionist economy. The United States had already imposed an additional tariff on India in August 2025 connected to India’s purchases of Russian oil.
This mattered because the United States was India’s largest individual export market.
India therefore confronted a classic concentration risk:
What happens when your largest export market becomes significantly less predictable?
The logical response is diversification.
The India-Pakistan Factor Also Mattered
Another important source of friction involved the four-day India-Pakistan conflict of May 2025.
President Trump repeatedly claimed that he had played a role in ending the confrontation.
India disputed the implication that outside mediation had determined the outcome.
This disagreement mattered beyond rhetoric.
India has traditionally resisted international mediation over disputes with Pakistan, particularly where Kashmir is concerned.
Therefore, repeated American claims of involvement touched one of India’s longstanding diplomatic sensitivities.
The broader lesson for New Delhi was potentially uncomfortable:
Personal chemistry between leaders cannot substitute for durable alignment of national interests.
Modi and Trump may maintain a workable personal relationship.
But India cannot construct its long-term foreign policy around the assumption that personal relationships will guarantee favourable American policy.
From “Howdy Modi” to Strategic Insurance
During Trump’s first presidency, the relationship between Modi and Trump became famous for highly visible political events and displays of personal rapport.
But states ultimately operate according to interests.
Governments change.
Presidents change.
Tariffs change.
Congress changes.
Strategic priorities change.
India therefore appears increasingly determined to institutionalize relationships across multiple countries rather than rely excessively upon political goodwill in Washington.
That is why the emerging model could be described as:
America Plus
The strategy is not:
America OR Europe
or
America OR Russia
or
America OR China
It is increasingly:
America + Europe + Russia + Japan + Australia + Middle East + Southeast Asia + Global South
where different partners serve different Indian interests.
The Deals Tell the Story
The most interesting element of the Times article is the nature of India’s recent agreements.
These are increasingly not ceremonial diplomatic declarations.
They involve specific economic and strategic objectives.
The article identifies India’s priorities broadly around:
- defence technology,
- regional security,
- energy,
- critical minerals,
- artificial intelligence,
- education and labour mobility,
- manufacturing,
- infrastructure,
- market access.
This indicates a shift from diplomacy focused primarily on relationships toward diplomacy focused on deliverables.
France: India’s European Strategic Anchor
France has become one of India’s most important strategic partners.
Unlike many Western countries, France has historically shown considerable respect for India’s desire for strategic autonomy.
The relationship encompasses:
- defence,
- aerospace,
- nuclear energy,
- artificial intelligence,
- maritime security,
- Indo-Pacific cooperation,
- technology,
- trade.
According to the Times, India and France have developed an especially close partnership centred partly on AI and governance, while seeking to double bilateral trade within five years.
France offers India something particularly valuable:
advanced Western technology without necessarily demanding complete geopolitical alignment with Washington.
This makes France unusually compatible with India’s strategic philosophy.
Germany: Technology and Industrial Capability
Germany represents another important component of the strategy.
The Times highlights submarine technology among the benefits India has pursued through its international engagements.
Germany’s importance extends beyond defence.
It is one of the world’s leading manufacturing economies.
India needs:
- industrial technology,
- advanced machinery,
- green technology,
- manufacturing know-how,
- defence technology,
- investment.
Germany needs access to one of the world’s largest emerging markets.
The relationship therefore has strong structural logic.
European Union: Perhaps the Biggest Economic Breakthrough
One of the most consequential developments highlighted in the article is India’s trade agreement with the European Union.
According to the Times, nearly two decades of negotiations were accelerated by the disruption of the international economic order.
This is strategically important.
The European Union represents a massive economic bloc.
Greater access to the European market provides Indian exporters with diversification away from excessive dependence on the United States.
At the same time, India reportedly made significant concessions, including tariff reductions affecting European products.
That suggests something important about India’s changing economic thinking.
New Delhi appears increasingly willing to accept domestic competitive pressure when the strategic payoff is sufficiently large.
Britain: Trade Diplomacy Becomes Practical
India’s agreement with the United Kingdom provides another example.
Rather than concentrating on grand strategic declarations, negotiations produced practical tariff compromises.
Britain obtained improved access in areas important to British exporters, while Indian sectors such as garments gained improved access.
This illustrates the emerging Indian approach:
transactional diplomacy without transactional dependency.
India is willing to negotiate issue by issue.
South Korea: Manufacturing and Shipbuilding
South Korea is particularly important because India’s ambitions require industrial capabilities.
The Times reports that South Korean President Lee Jae Myung promised investment and shipbuilding assistance.
India aims to become one of the world’s five largest shipbuilding nations by 2047.
That objective cannot be achieved through diplomacy alone.
India needs:
- shipyard technology,
- manufacturing processes,
- supplier ecosystems,
- skilled workers,
- financing,
- commercial orders.
South Korea possesses precisely these capabilities.
This demonstrates how India’s foreign policy is increasingly connected directly to its industrial policy.
New Zealand: A Relationship That Had Been Underdeveloped
Modi’s visit to New Zealand was notable because the Times describes him as the first Indian prime minister to visit the country in four decades.
The agenda reportedly included maritime security and the ambition of doubling bilateral trade.
On its own, New Zealand will not transform India’s strategic position.
But that misses the point.
The entire strategy works through accumulation.
One additional relationship may appear modest.
Twenty stronger relationships create strategic depth.
That is the meaning behind “one deal at a time.”
Norway and EFTA: Investment Becomes Foreign Policy
The Times also points to Norway’s commitment connected with the European Free Trade Association agreement.
The objective includes significant employment creation in India.
This reveals another dimension of Modi’s diplomacy.
Foreign policy is increasingly being used as an instrument of domestic economic transformation.
The objective is no longer simply:
What diplomatic support can India obtain?
Increasingly it is:
What investment, technology, jobs, factories and market access can India obtain?
Japan and Australia Remain Essential
The Times places Japan and Australia within India’s broader effort to strengthen relationships with countries concerned about China’s growing influence in the Indo-Pacific.
This creates an interesting balancing structure.
India can cooperate with Washington, Tokyo and Canberra through the Quad.
At the same time, India can maintain its relationship with Russia.
It can strengthen relations with Europe.
And where necessary, it can manage competition with China without permanently closing diplomatic channels.
This is classic multi-alignment.
Russia Remains Part of the Equation
Perhaps nothing demonstrates India’s strategic autonomy more clearly than its continued relationship with Russia.
For Washington, India’s Russian oil purchases have been contentious.
For New Delhi, however, energy policy is fundamentally connected to national economic interests.
India imports the overwhelming majority of the crude oil it consumes.
Affordable energy therefore affects:
- inflation,
- transportation,
- manufacturing,
- household expenditure,
- government finances,
- economic growth.
New Delhi is unlikely to abandon a useful energy relationship merely to satisfy another country’s geopolitical preferences unless the costs become unacceptable.
India’s relationship with Moscow also includes decades of defence cooperation.
That does not mean India supports every Russian action.
It means India distinguishes between partnership and alignment.
The Iran War Adds Another Layer
The Times article also identifies the Iran conflict as an additional reason for India’s urgency.
Energy security is central to Indian strategic planning.
A very large portion of India’s imported crude traditionally moves through maritime routes affected by instability around the Strait of Hormuz.
Any prolonged disruption creates enormous risks.
India therefore has incentives to diversify not merely its suppliers but also:
- transportation corridors,
- ports,
- pipelines,
- strategic petroleum reserves,
- shipping relationships,
- overland connectivity.
Foreign policy and energy security are consequently becoming inseparable.
India’s New Strategy Can Be Understood as a Portfolio
A useful way to understand the strategy is to imagine India’s foreign relationships as an investment portfolio.
United States
Technology, investment, defence, education, Indo-Pacific security.
France
Defence, aerospace, nuclear energy, AI and strategic technology.
European Union
Trade, investment, manufacturing and technology.
Russia
Energy, defence and geopolitical balancing.
Japan
Infrastructure, capital, manufacturing and Indo-Pacific cooperation.
South Korea
Manufacturing, electronics and shipbuilding.
Australia
Critical minerals, education and Indo-Pacific security.
Middle East
Energy, investment, logistics and connectivity.
Southeast Asia
Trade, manufacturing supply chains and maritime security.
Africa
Resources, markets, pharmaceuticals and Global South partnerships.
The portfolio becomes resilient precisely because no single relationship has to satisfy every Indian requirement.
Why the New York Times Article Is Significant
The significance of the article extends beyond its individual observations.
It represents recognition in influential Western commentary that Indian foreign policy increasingly needs to be understood on its own terms rather than simply through the question:
“Is India aligned with the United States or not?”
That binary framework is increasingly inadequate.
India’s preferred answer is essentially:
India is aligned with India.
New Delhi will cooperate with countries where interests converge and disagree where they do not.
That can occasionally frustrate Washington.
It can frustrate Moscow.
It can frustrate Brussels.
And it certainly complicates Beijing’s strategic calculations.
But from India’s perspective, that flexibility is the objective rather than a flaw.
Strategic Autonomy 2.0
India’s older concept of non-alignment emerged during the Cold War.
The world was divided largely between two blocs:
United States-led West
versus
Soviet-led communist bloc
India resisted formally joining either.
Today’s international system is very different.
The emerging doctrine might therefore be called:
Strategic Autonomy 2.0
It does not mean remaining distant from everyone.
It means cooperating intensely with almost everyone while avoiding excessive dependency on anyone.
Old non-alignment could sometimes mean keeping distance.
Modern multi-alignment means simultaneous engagement.
That is a major conceptual difference.
Modi’s Foreign Policy Is Becoming More Economic
Another major significance of the Times analysis is its emphasis on economic diplomacy.
India’s foreign policy was historically dominated by:
- territorial security,
- Pakistan,
- China,
- nuclear policy,
- relations with major powers.
Those issues remain important.
But economic considerations increasingly sit at the centre of diplomacy.
India needs enormous quantities of:
- capital,
- technology,
- energy,
- critical minerals,
- manufacturing equipment,
- defence technology,
- export markets.
Why?
Because India’s geopolitical ambitions ultimately depend upon economic power.
A country cannot indefinitely sustain great-power ambitions without a sufficiently large industrial and technological base.
The China Dimension Cannot Be Ignored
Although the Times article focuses on Trump’s effect on Indian strategy, China remains the deeper structural variable.
India faces a geopolitical challenge that few other major countries confront simultaneously:
It must manage an increasingly powerful China on a disputed Himalayan border while competing with China economically and seeking to maintain diplomatic engagement with Beijing.
The United States remains extremely useful in that environment.
So do Japan, Australia and France.
This is precisely why India is unlikely to abandon Washington.
But it is equally why India cannot afford a foreign policy in which American policy changes automatically determine India’s options.
India needs Washington—but also needs alternatives.
Is India Moving Away From America?
Probably not.
A more accurate interpretation is that India is attempting to de-risk the relationship.
There is an important difference between:
Decoupling
Reducing the relationship itself.
and
De-risking
Reducing the damage that deterioration in the relationship could cause.
India appears much closer to the second strategy.
It can continue expanding defence cooperation with America while buying Russian energy.
It can participate in the Quad while participating in BRICS.
It can cooperate with Western countries on China while negotiating directly with Beijing.
It can sign trade agreements with Europe while negotiating economic issues with Washington.
These apparent contradictions are actually features of multi-alignment.
Trump May Have Accelerated Something India Already Wanted
This may ultimately be the most important point.
It would be too simplistic to argue that Donald Trump created India’s strategic autonomy.
India has pursued autonomy for decades.
What Trump’s unpredictability may have done is increase the economic value of diversification.
If American market access, tariffs or political commitments can change rapidly, India has a stronger incentive to develop alternatives.
Paradoxically, therefore, pressure intended to obtain concessions from India can sometimes accelerate India’s search for other partners.
This produces an interesting strategic paradox:
The more unpredictable Washington becomes, the more valuable India’s relationships outside Washington become.
India Is Also Becoming More Valuable to Everyone Else
There is another side to the equation.
India is not simply travelling around the world asking countries for favours.
Other countries increasingly need India.
Why?
Because India offers:
- a huge consumer market,
- rapid economic growth,
- manufacturing potential,
- a large skilled workforce,
- digital capabilities,
- pharmaceutical production,
- geographic access to the Indian Ocean,
- an alternative manufacturing location to China,
- significant military power.
This changes India’s bargaining position.
European countries seeking alternatives to excessive dependence on China see India differently.
Japan sees India differently.
Middle Eastern investors see India differently.
Global manufacturers see India differently.
India’s economic scale increasingly converts into diplomatic leverage.
From Strategic Autonomy to Strategic Optionality
Perhaps an even better description of India’s emerging strategy is:
Strategic Optionality
Strategic autonomy means retaining the freedom to decide.
Strategic optionality means having enough alternatives that the freedom is actually usable.
There is little value in claiming autonomy if only one country can provide the technology you require.
There is little value in claiming energy independence if only one supplier can provide affordable fuel.
There is little value in claiming trade autonomy if one market dominates exports.
Real strategic autonomy therefore requires alternatives.
That is why Modi’s deal-making matters.
Every additional supplier, investor, export market and technology partner potentially creates another option.
The “One Deal at a Time” Strategy
Seen from this perspective, the headline captures something important.
India’s strategy does not necessarily depend upon one grand alliance.
Instead, it can accumulate power through hundreds of smaller arrangements:
one trade agreement,
one defence partnership,
one technology-transfer agreement,
one critical-minerals partnership,
one shipbuilding arrangement,
one energy corridor,
one university agreement,
one manufacturing investment
at a time.
Individually, these agreements may appear incremental.
Collectively, they can transform India’s strategic position.
A Possible New Indian Grand Strategy
India’s emerging grand strategy can perhaps be summarized in five principles.
1. Remain Close to America—but Never Dependent on America
The United States remains too important economically, technologically and strategically to ignore.
But India wants alternatives.
2. Maintain Russia—but Diversify Beyond Russia
Russia remains important, especially for energy and defence, but India’s defence and economic relationships are becoming increasingly diversified.
3. Compete With China—but Keep Diplomatic Channels Open
China is India’s principal long-term Asian strategic competitor, yet it is also a major economic power and neighbour.
Permanent confrontation would carry enormous costs.
4. Build Europe Into an Independent Strategic Pillar
France, Germany, Britain and the European Union can provide technology, markets and investment without forcing India to choose between Washington and Moscow.
5. Become a Pole Rather Than Join a Pole
This is perhaps the ultimate objective.
India does not merely want membership in someone else’s geopolitical camp.
India wants sufficient economic, technological and military power to become an independent centre of influence.
What Could Go Wrong?
The strategy is sophisticated, but it carries risks.
Multi-alignment becomes difficult when major powers demand choices.
What happens if US-China tensions escalate dramatically?
What happens if Washington imposes severe secondary sanctions connected with Russia?
What happens if another India-China border confrontation occurs?
What happens if European and American technology controls become much stricter?
At some point, strategic ambiguity may become difficult to sustain.
There is also an economic challenge.
Trade agreements expose protected Indian industries to greater foreign competition.
Indian manufacturers will need to become significantly more productive.
Diplomatic diversification cannot substitute for domestic economic reform.
The Most Important Requirement: India’s Economy Must Deliver
Ultimately, strategic autonomy rests on economic strength.
India’s diplomatic leverage will rise only if the country can:
- maintain rapid economic growth,
- create large-scale manufacturing employment,
- improve infrastructure,
- develop advanced technologies,
- increase exports,
- strengthen defence manufacturing,
- secure energy supplies,
- develop human capital.
Foreign policy can create opportunities.
Domestic policy must convert those opportunities into power.
This is why trade agreements, technology partnerships and manufacturing investments matter so much.
They connect foreign policy directly to India’s economic transformation.
Conclusion: India Is Not Choosing Sides—It Is Trying to Become a Side
The deeper significance of The New York Times article is not simply that Narendra Modi is travelling extensively or signing agreements with many countries.
It is that India’s foreign policy may be entering a new phase.
The old question was:
Will India align with America?
The emerging answer may be:
India will partner with America—but it does not intend to become dependent upon America.
The same principle applies to Russia, Europe and potentially every other major power.
India wants American technology.
European markets.
Russian energy.
Japanese capital.
South Korean manufacturing expertise.
Australian critical minerals.
Middle Eastern investment.
Southeast Asian connectivity.
And partnerships across the Global South.
It wants these relationships simultaneously.
That is not traditional neutrality.
It is multi-alignment backed by strategic autonomy.
Trump’s policies may have accelerated the process by demonstrating to New Delhi that even a close relationship with Washington can become unpredictable when American domestic politics changes.
But the strategy is larger than Trump.
Presidents come and go.
India’s interests remain.
The real objective therefore appears to be building an international network sufficiently diversified that no single election in Washington, crisis in Moscow, dispute with Beijing or conflict in the Middle East can fundamentally derail India’s economic rise.
This is why the phrase “one deal at a time” is so important.
India may not be building one grand alliance.
It is building something potentially more flexible:
a global portfolio of strategic options.
And the ultimate ambition appears even larger.
India does not simply want to choose between the world’s major geopolitical poles.
India wants to become one of them.
