The concept of an “Islamic NATO”—officially titled the Islamic Military Counter-Terrorism Coalition (IMCTC)—was unveiled to the world in December 2015 with immense fanfare. Spearheaded by Saudi Arabia’s then-Deputy Crown Prince (now Crown Prince) Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), it was envisioned as a pan-Islamic military alliance of 34 (later 41) nations to combat terrorism.
However, nearly a decade later, the IMCTC remains a “paper tiger.” It failed to transition from a Riyadh-based secretariat into a functional military force. The disintegration of this alliance before it could even take flight is a masterclass in the complexities of Middle Eastern geopolitics, sectarian divides, and the clash between national interests and collective security.
1. The Genesis: Ambition Without Consensus
The IMCTC was launched at a time when ISIS was at its peak and the U.S. was perceived to be retreating from its traditional role as the Middle East’s security guarantor. Saudi Arabia sought to position itself as the leader of the Muslim world, capable of mobilizing a “unified front.”
The Fundamental Flaw: The coalition was announced so hastily that many member states (including Pakistan, Malaysia, and Lebanon) reportedly learned of their inclusion through news reports. This lack of prior diplomatic groundwork meant there was no shared definition of “terrorism” or a clear “Rules of Engagement” (ROE).
2. The Sectarian Fault Line: The “Sunni Bloc” Label
The most significant factor in the IMCTC’s stagnation was its exclusion of Iran, Iraq, and Syria.
- The Iran Factor: Because the coalition was led by Riyadh and excluded Tehran, it was immediately branded by analysts and rival nations as a “Sunni Military Alliance” aimed at countering Iranian influence rather than fighting global terrorism.
- The Neutrality Crisis: Countries with significant Shia populations or those sharing borders with Iran (such as Oman, Kuwait, and Pakistan) were wary of being dragged into a Saudi-Iran proxy war. This sectarian undertone stripped the coalition of its “Pan-Islamic” legitimacy.
3. The Definition of “Terrorism”
For a military alliance to function, all members must agree on who the enemy is. In the IMCTC, this consensus was non-existent.
- Saudi Arabia and UAE viewed the Muslim Brotherhood and Hezbollah as terrorist organizations.
- Turkey and Qatar maintained ties with the Muslim Brotherhood.
- Pakistan was focused on groups like the TTP but was unwilling to designate Iranian-backed groups as terrorists to avoid domestic unrest.
When the “Islamic NATO” couldn’t agree on a common list of enemies, the prospect of joint military operations became impossible.
4. The Qatar Crisis: The Internal Fracture
In June 2017, the alliance suffered a near-fatal blow when Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt imposed a blockade on Qatar—a fellow IMCTC member.
The spectacle of the coalition’s leader “attacking” one of its own members through economic and diplomatic warfare destroyed the narrative of Islamic unity. It proved that the alliance was a tool for Saudi foreign policy rather than a collective security framework. If the “Islamic NATO” could not maintain peace among its own members, it had no credibility to police the wider region.
5. The “Pakistan Paradox” and General Raheel Sharif
To give the IMCTC military weight, Saudi Arabia recruited General Raheel Sharif, the highly respected former Chief of Army Staff of Pakistan, to lead the coalition.
However, his appointment became a source of political friction in Pakistan. The Pakistani parliament had already passed a resolution to remain neutral in Middle Eastern conflicts (specifically Yemen). Consequently, General Sharif was forced to operate in a vacuum. He was the commander of a “coalition” that had:
- No standing army.
- No unified command structure.
- No budget independent of the Saudi treasury.
His role eventually shifted from military commander to a figurehead in a Riyadh-based think tank.
6. The Yemen War: The Failed “Test Case”
While the IMCTC was being formed, a separate Saudi-led coalition was already fighting in Yemen against the Houthi rebels. The struggles of the Saudi military in Yemen—despite billions in Western hardware—acted as a deterrent for other Muslim nations.
Prospective IMCTC members saw the Yemen conflict as a quagmire. They were unwilling to contribute boots on the ground to a coalition that seemed incapable of achieving a decisive victory against a non-state actor, fearing their troops would be used as “mercenaries” for Saudi interests.
7. The Final Blow: The Saudi-Iran Rapprochement
The ultimate geopolitical nail in the coffin for the “Islamic NATO” as a confrontational force came in March 2023. In a landmark deal brokered by China, Saudi Arabia and Iran agreed to restore diplomatic ties.
With Riyadh shifting its strategy from “confrontation” to “economic stability” (to protect its Vision 2030 goals), the need for a massive anti-Iran military bloc vanished. The IMCTC has since pivoted its focus toward “intellectual, communications, and financing” aspects of counter-terrorism—essentially becoming a center for information sharing rather than a military alliance.
