A proposal emerging from Moscow could eventually transform the physical geography of India–Russia trade. Russia is exploring an overland railway connection toward India and the Indian Ocean, presenting it as a way to diversify transport routes and reduce exposure to vulnerable maritime chokepoints. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Marat Khusnullin has publicly said alternative railway routes providing access toward India should be examined.
The idea has attracted attention because India and Russia are already trying to expand the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), a multimodal network connecting India with Iran, the Caspian region and Russia. India and Russia have also set a target of taking bilateral trade beyond $100 billion by 2030, while specifically identifying the INSTC, Northern Sea Route and Chennai–Vladivostok maritime corridor as important connectivity initiatives.
However, the phrase “Russia-to-India railway” requires an important qualification. As of August 2026, this is an exploratory geopolitical and infrastructure proposal—not an approved Moscow-to-Delhi railway with finalized alignment, financing, construction contracts or completion date. Several possible routes are being discussed, and formidable political and engineering obstacles remain.
If those obstacles could eventually be overcome, however, the project could become one of the most consequential Eurasian connectivity initiatives of the coming decades.
What Exactly Has Russia Proposed?
The basic Russian idea is surprisingly ambitious:
Create a substantially land-based transport corridor connecting Russia with the Indian Ocean and ultimately India.
Moscow’s objective is not simply to operate a passenger train between the two countries. The economically significant proposition is a freight corridor capable of moving commodities, containers, industrial goods and potentially energy-related cargo between Russia and South Asia.
Russian officials have discussed examining routes involving Central Asia, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan, although there is not yet one officially agreed alignment.
That distinction is crucial.
The project currently represents a strategic concept with alternative route possibilities, rather than a railway whose exact path has already been decided.
Why Russia Wants a Railway Connection to India
Russia’s interest needs to be understood in the context of a rapidly changing global transportation system.
For centuries, maritime trade has depended upon a relatively small number of strategic passages. Modern commerce remains highly vulnerable to disruption at these locations.
Two routes are particularly important in Russia’s calculations:
The Strait of Hormuz
The Strait of Hormuz connects the Persian Gulf with the Arabian Sea and is one of the world’s most strategically sensitive energy corridors.
Conflict or prolonged disruption around Hormuz can affect shipping costs, insurance premiums and energy markets.
The Bosphorus
The Turkish Straits provide strategically important maritime access between the Black Sea and Mediterranean.
Russia therefore has strong incentives to create multiple independent routes to international markets rather than depending excessively on maritime chokepoints.
Khusnullin specifically presented greater land connectivity as a way of reducing these vulnerabilities.
The Bigger Project Already Exists: INSTC
The proposed railway should not be viewed entirely as a new idea.
Its foundations can be found in the International North-South Transport Corridor.
INSTC is a multimodal transportation network designed to connect:
India → Iran → Caspian region → Russia → Northern Europe
India’s Ministry of Ports has described INSTC as a route linking the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf with the Caspian Sea through Iran and onward toward northern Europe through Russia.
India and Russia have supported this project for more than two decades. As far back as 2005, Indian government statements described INSTC as a faster and potentially more cost-effective alternative for moving cargo between India, Russia and the CIS through Iran.
The new Russian railway concept can therefore be understood partly as an attempt to push Eurasian connectivity farther toward continuous land transportation.
How the Existing India–Russia Corridor Works
One configuration highlighted by India’s government illustrates the current multimodal model.
Cargo can move approximately as follows:
Mumbai
↓
Chabahar, Iran — by sea
↓
Northern Iran — road/rail
↓
Bandar Anzali
↓
Caspian Sea
↓
Astrakhan, Russia
↓
Russian railway network
The Indian government has specifically highlighted Chabahar’s potential connection with INSTC and its role as a transit hub linking India with Central Asia and Russia.
The proposed Russian concept asks a much bigger question:
Could more of this journey eventually become a continuous railway?
Possible Route 1: Russia–Central Asia–Iran–Pakistan–India
One potential concept being discussed would broadly run:
Russia → Central Asia → Iran → Pakistan → India
This would theoretically provide a largely overland freight route from Russia into the Indian subcontinent.
From a purely geographical perspective, it is attractive.
Politically, however, it is extremely complicated.
A railway entering India through Pakistan would depend on stable India–Pakistan relations and reliable cross-border freight arrangements.
Given the history of political and military tensions between India and Pakistan, that would represent one of the biggest obstacles to such a corridor.
Therefore, geographic feasibility should not be confused with political feasibility.
Possible Route 2: Russia–Central Asia–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India
Another theoretical alignment could involve:
Russia
↓
Central Asia
↓
Afghanistan
↓
Pakistan
↓
India
This route could create a remarkable north-south Eurasian transportation axis.
But it would face even greater challenges.
Afghanistan requires substantial railway infrastructure development, while security, financing, international recognition and transit agreements would all have to be addressed.
The project would consequently require cooperation among countries whose geopolitical interests do not always align.
Possible Route 3: Russia–Iran–Indian Ocean–India
The most immediately realistic strategy may therefore remain an expanded version of INSTC:
Russia → Azerbaijan/Caspian region → Iran → Iranian port → India by sea.
This would not technically create a completely continuous Russia-to-India railway, but it could achieve much of the economic objective.
Iran would become the critical land bridge connecting Russia with the Indian Ocean.
India could then use ports such as Chabahar to connect Indian maritime trade with the Eurasian rail network.
India has already promoted precisely this relationship between Chabahar and INSTC.
The Critical Rasht–Astara Railway
One of the most important pieces of the larger north-south network is the missing railway connection between Rasht and Astara in Iran.
Closing infrastructure gaps in northern Iran would improve railway continuity between the Iranian and Russian-connected transport systems.
This illustrates an important reality about the proposed India–Russia corridor:
It does not necessarily require constructing thousands of kilometres of entirely new railway.
Instead, much of the challenge involves connecting existing national railway systems and eliminating missing links.
Why India Could Be Interested
For India, the proposal has several potentially significant advantages.
1. Direct Access to Russia
India and Russia have a large and growing trading relationship.
India imports significant quantities of:
- Crude oil
- Coal
- Fertilizers
- Metals
- Defence-related equipment and components
Russia, meanwhile, wants to increase imports of Indian pharmaceuticals, machinery, agricultural products, chemicals, consumer goods and other manufactured products.
A reliable freight corridor could help broaden this relationship.
2. India’s $100-Billion Trade Ambition
India and Russia have officially stated an ambition to achieve bilateral trade exceeding $100 billion by 2030.
Their bilateral economic cooperation declaration specifically calls for increasing cargo movement through:
- International North-South Transport Corridor
- Northern Sea Route
- Chennai–Vladivostok maritime corridor.
A stronger railway network could become another component of this broader connectivity strategy.
3. India’s Access to Central Asia
India faces an unusual geographical disadvantage.
Central Asia is relatively close to India geographically, but India’s direct overland access is constrained.
A functioning north-south transportation network could improve India’s commercial access to:
- Kazakhstan
- Uzbekistan
- Turkmenistan
- Kyrgyzstan
- Tajikistan
- Russia
That could dramatically expand India’s economic engagement with Eurasia.
4. Strategic Importance of Chabahar
This is where India’s investment in Iran’s Chabahar Port becomes particularly important.
Chabahar provides India with access toward Iran and Central Asia.
India has explicitly described the port as strategically advantageous for linking with INSTC and facilitating trade with Russia and Central Asian countries.
An expanded Eurasian railway system could therefore significantly increase Chabahar’s commercial importance.
Could Russian Oil Reach India by Rail?
This is one of the most intriguing possibilities—but it requires caution.
Railways can transport petroleum products, but moving the enormous volumes associated with India’s crude imports is generally much more economical through pipelines or large oil tankers.
Therefore, a Russia–India railway is unlikely to replace maritime crude transportation.
Its greater value would probably be in moving:
- Containerized cargo
- Fertilizers
- Coal and minerals
- Agricultural products
- Machinery
- Automotive components
- Chemicals
- Manufactured goods
The railway would therefore complement rather than replace maritime energy trade.
Could India Export More to Russia?
This may ultimately be one of the project’s biggest benefits for India.
India’s trade with Russia has become heavily imbalanced because India’s imports—particularly energy—substantially exceed its exports.
Better logistics could make Indian products more competitive in Russian markets.
Potential beneficiaries include:
Pharmaceuticals
India is already one of the world’s largest generic medicine producers.
Engineering products
Industrial machinery, automotive components and electrical equipment could gain easier access to Eurasian markets.
Agriculture
Tea, coffee, rice, spices, seafood and processed foods could potentially benefit from improved logistics.
Consumer products
Textiles, garments, electronics and other manufactured goods could find larger markets.
A transport corridor therefore has the potential to address not only trade volume but also trade balance.
A Eurasian Alternative to the Suez Canal
The strategic importance becomes clearer when viewed on a world map.
Traditional India–Europe maritime trade broadly travels:
India → Arabian Sea → Red Sea → Suez Canal → Mediterranean → Europe
INSTC instead creates a northbound alternative:
India → Iran → Caspian/Eurasia → Russia → Europe
The objective is not necessarily to replace the Suez Canal.
Rather, it creates route redundancy.
If conflict, blockades, accidents or geopolitical instability disrupt one corridor, alternative transportation networks become extremely valuable.
Why Iran Becomes Crucial
Iran sits almost perfectly between Russia and the Indian Ocean.
Its geography connects:
- Central Asia
- Caucasus
- Caspian Sea
- Persian Gulf
- Arabian Sea
Consequently, Iran could become one of the most important transit countries in a future Eurasian north-south transportation system.
This is also why the development of Iranian railway infrastructure has significance well beyond Iran itself.
The Pakistan Question
The most politically sensitive aspect of a truly continuous railway into India is Pakistan.
A land route from Iran or Afghanistan into India naturally encounters Pakistan.
Commercially, transit through Pakistan could potentially provide the shortest connection.
Politically, it would require extraordinary levels of cooperation.
Among the unresolved questions would be:
- Would Pakistan guarantee Indian freight transit?
- How would customs inspections work?
- How would cargo security be guaranteed?
- What would happen during India–Pakistan political crises?
- Could transit remain operational during military tensions?
Unless these questions can be answered through durable international agreements, India would understandably be reluctant to make a strategic trade corridor dependent upon Pakistani territory.
Afghanistan: Opportunity and Risk
Afghanistan could theoretically become another important transit state.
Its location gives it enormous potential as a bridge connecting Central and South Asia.
A railway network through Afghanistan could stimulate:
- Mining
- Transit revenues
- Logistics
- Regional trade
- Infrastructure development
But political instability, security concerns and financing difficulties make large-scale international railway projects challenging.
The Gauge Problem
There is also a less glamorous but extremely important technical obstacle: railway gauge.
Russia and several former Soviet republics predominantly use a 1,520-mm broad gauge.
Iran predominantly uses 1,435-mm standard gauge.
India predominantly uses 1,676-mm broad gauge.
That means a train cannot simply leave Moscow and continue unchanged all the way into India.
Cargo would potentially require:
- Transshipment between trains,
- Adjustable-gauge systems,
- Bogie changes,
- Or sophisticated multimodal logistics terminals.
Therefore, a “direct railway” does not necessarily mean one train running uninterrupted from Moscow to Delhi.
It is more accurately understood as an integrated railway freight corridor.
Customs Could Be Harder Than Construction
Railway tracks alone cannot create an efficient trade corridor.
Countries would also need harmonized systems covering:
- Customs
- Cargo documentation
- Insurance
- Transit guarantees
- Container standards
- Digital tracking
- Border inspections
- Freight tariffs
Interestingly, India and Russia have discussed these issues for years through INSTC. A 2019 bilateral statement specifically emphasized simplifying document workflows, introducing electronic documentation and applying digital technologies to transportation.
This administrative integration could ultimately be as important as physical infrastructure.
Geopolitical Implications
If successfully developed, the corridor could reshape Eurasian geopolitics.
For Russia
It would provide greater access to South Asian and Indian Ocean markets.
For India
It would create additional access to Russia and Central Asia.
For Iran
It could establish Iran as a major Eurasian transit hub.
For Central Asia
Landlocked economies could gain additional routes toward the Indian Ocean.
For Pakistan
Participation could generate substantial transit revenue—but would require a major political decision regarding regional economic integration.
For Afghanistan
It could provide an opportunity to become a transit bridge between Central and South Asia.
Is This Russia’s Answer to China’s Belt and Road Initiative?
There are similarities, but they should not be overstated.
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a vast collection of infrastructure investments spanning numerous continents.
INSTC and the proposed Russia–India railway are more geographically focused.
Nevertheless, both reflect the same fundamental geopolitical principle:
Infrastructure creates strategic influence.
Countries controlling ports, railway junctions and logistics corridors gain economic and geopolitical importance.
A successful north-south Eurasian corridor would consequently add another major axis to Eurasia’s transportation architecture.
Major Obstacles
Despite its enormous potential, the proposed railway faces serious challenges.
The most important are:
- India–Pakistan relations
- Political and security conditions in Afghanistan
- International sanctions affecting Russia and Iran
- Financing requirements
- Missing railway infrastructure
- Different railway gauges
- Customs and border procedures
- Security of freight corridors
- Commercial viability
- Need for agreements among numerous governments
These issues explain why the project should currently be regarded as a strategic proposal rather than an imminent railway project.
What Is Most Likely to Happen?
A single Moscow-to-India railway appearing in the immediate future is unlikely.
A more realistic development would occur incrementally:
Stage 1: Complete missing railway links within the existing INSTC.
Stage 2: Increase freight traffic between Russia and Iran.
Stage 3: Strengthen Iranian connections toward Chabahar and other southern ports.
Stage 4: Expand India–Iran maritime connectivity.
Stage 5: Develop additional Central Asian railway connections.
Stage 6: If regional politics eventually permit, explore continuous overland connectivity toward India.
In other words, the “Russia–India railway” may emerge not as one giant construction project but as a network gradually assembled from multiple national rail systems and transport corridors.
Strategic Significance for India
For India, the most important feature of the proposal is therefore not the possibility of boarding a train in Delhi and getting off in Moscow.
Its significance lies in something much bigger:
Creating another economic artery connecting India with Eurasia.
India’s international connectivity increasingly rests on several complementary corridors:
INSTC: India–Iran–Russia–Europe
Chennai–Vladivostok Corridor: India–Russian Far East
Chabahar: India–Iran–Central Asia
IMEC: India–Middle East–Europe
A strengthened Russia–India rail corridor could become another component of this diversified connectivity strategy.
Conclusion
Russia’s proposal to explore railway connectivity with India is ambitious, but it is not as far-fetched as it initially sounds.
The foundations already exist through the International North-South Transport Corridor, decades of India–Russia transport cooperation, Iranian railway development and India’s investment in Chabahar. India and Russia have formally committed themselves to increasing cargo movement through new connectivity routes as they pursue bilateral trade exceeding $100 billion by 2030.
What is new is Moscow’s growing interest in pushing this concept toward a more extensive overland railway network reaching the Indian Ocean and potentially India, partly to reduce vulnerability to maritime chokepoints.
The economic possibilities are substantial: faster Eurasian freight movement, expanded Indian exports, improved Russian access to South Asia, greater Central Asian connectivity and increased strategic importance for Iran and Chabahar.
But geography is easier than geopolitics. Pakistan transit, Afghanistan’s stability, sanctions, financing, missing infrastructure and incompatible railway gauges mean that a seamless Moscow-to-India railway remains a long-term proposition rather than a finalized project.
Nevertheless, if even part of this vision materializes, its importance could extend far beyond trains and freight. It could help create a new north-south economic axis across Eurasia, connecting Russia, Central Asia, Iran and the Indian Ocean—and potentially giving India another strategic gateway into the Eurasian continent.

